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I. INTRODUCTION 
Advanced Practice Registered Nurses (“APRNs”) are skilled 
clinicians whose expertise could aid immensely in the expansion 
and affordability of healthcare in the United States.  Unfortunately, 
their practice is often hobbled by cumbersome collaborative 
agreements with physicians.  A 2011 Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) 
report on the future of nursing recommended that “[n]urses should 
practice to the full extent of their education and training.”1  This 
would entail uncoupling APRNs from physician oversight of their 
practice, as current regulation in most states mandates that APRNs 
must operate to some extent in collaboration with, and accountable 
to, a supervising physician. 
While many states currently have legislation in place—or 
pending—granting APRNs the right to practice to the extent of their 
training, the expansion of APRN roles in the care of patients is not 
without controversy.2  The IOM report received backlash from 
physician groups, including the American Medical Association 
(“AMA”), who urged that such expansion would not improve 
quality of care, ostensibly because nurses do not receive the level of 
training that physicians receive.3  However, such concerns are 
almost entirely unsupported by empirical studies.  Moreover, this 
interference from physicians, in the face of ample evidence that 
APRNs supply care that is at least favorably comparable to that of 
physicians, calls into question whether physicians have patients’ 
best interests in mind, or whether their attitudes and actions are in 
 
 1  NST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF NURSING: LEADING CHANGE, ADVANCING HEALTH S-4 
(2011) [hereinafter IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT], available at http://www.thefuture 
ofnursing.org/sites/default/files/Future%20of%20Nursing%20Report_0.pdf. 
 2  NAT’L ASSOC. OF CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALISTS, SCOPE OF PRACTICE FAQS FOR 
CONSUMERS 2-3, http://www.nacns.org/docs/toolkit/3A-FAQScope.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2015). 
 3  Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n., AMA Responds to IOM Report on Future of 
Nursing (Oct. 5, 2010) available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/ 
nursing-future-workforce.page. 
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fact anticompetitive.  The question then becomes whether 
physicians’ opposition puts them at risk of antitrust liability. 
This Note proceeds in three parts: Part II introduces the reader 
to APRNs, including their training, education and practice, and the 
data available on their competency as healthcare practitioners.  It 
also discusses the clinician shortages and expanded Medicaid and 
insurance coverage that leads to the necessity of expanded access to 
healthcare. 
Part III discusses the current legislative scheme that regulates 
the scope of practice for APRNs.  It then explores the Institute of 
Medicine’s report and efforts from various agencies advocating the 
expanded scope of practice for APRNs.  This Note calls upon current 
legislatures, especially New Jersey’s, to amend laws governing the 
practice of nursing to expand APRNs’ scope of practice. 
Part IV discusses physician opposition to this legislative action, 
and opines that it is motivated by anticompetitive concerns rather 
than patient care concerns; this section suggests possible remedies, 
concluding with the proposition that while antitrust actions may 
provide some limited remedies for isolated cases of blatant 
anticompetitive behavior, the issue must ultimately be resolved by 
state legislatures.4 
II. APRN BACKGROUND AND REGULATION 
A. Introduction to APRN 
“APRN” is a specific category of nursing professional as defined 
by most state practice laws.5  An APRN is a medical professional with 
an advanced nursing (post-graduate) degree in one of four 
specialties: certified registered nurse anesthetist (“CRNA”), certified 
nurse-midwife (“CNM”), clinical nurse specialist (“CNS”), and 
certified nurse practitioner (“CNP”).6  Each practitioner specializes 
 
 4  This Note does not argue or advocate for expanded scope of practice for any 
professions aside from that of APRNs.  While I acknowledge that certain other 
practitioners, including chiropractors, naturopaths, and various others argue for 
expanded scope of practice rights, these professions are starkly distinct from APRNs, 
and their arguments for expanded scope of practice are not meant to be supported by 
the research found in this Note.  
 5  Daniel J. Gilman & Julie Fairman, Antitrust and the Future of Nursing: Federal 
Competition Policy and the Scope of Practice, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 145 (2014). 
 6  APRN CONSENSUS WORK GRP & NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE BDS. OF NURSING., 
CONSENSUS MODEL FOR APRN REGULATION: LICENSURE, ACCREDITATION, CERTIFICATION & 
EDUCATION 6 (2008) [hereinafter NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL], https://www.ncsbn. 
org/Consensus_Model_for_APRN_Regulation_July_2008.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 
2015). 
BARBARITO FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  8:56 PM 
130 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 40:1 
in the care of at least one population, including: family/individual 
across the lifespan, adult-gerontology, pediatrics, neonatal, 
women’s health/gender-related, or psych/mental health.7 
Academics have discussed whether APRNs should complete a 
residency program for clinical training, and there currently exist 
several such programs throughout the United States.8  Many 
institutions conferring APRN degrees carry a credit load which, in 
other healthcare degree programs, would be equivalent to a doctoral 
degree.9 
Each APRN specialist is trained in a specific area of healthcare.  
The CRNA is trained to provide anesthesia for a diverse spectrum of 
patients in diverse locations.10  He or she will administer anesthesia 
to both healthy and severely ill patients, for a wide variety of 
procedures, in settings that include “hospital surgical suites and 
obstetrical delivery rooms; critical access hospitals; acute care; pain 
management centers; ambulatory surgical centers; and the offices of 
dentists, podiatrists, ophthalmologists, and plastic surgeons.”11 
The CNM provides a wide variety of care to women, “including 
gynecologic care, family planning services, preconception care, 
prenatal and postpartum care, childbirth, and care of the 
newborn.”12  For treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and 
reproductive health, patients of the CNM occasionally include the 
male partners of their female patients.13  The CNM practices in many 
settings, including “home, hospital, birth center, and a variety of 
ambulatory care settings including private offices and community 
and public health clinics.”14 
The CNS “is responsible and accountable for diagnosis and 
 
 7  Id. at 6. 
 8  Kate Darby Rauch, Are Residencies the Future of Nurse Practitioner Training?, 
SCIENCE OF CARING (Jan. 2013), http://scienceofcaring.ucsf.edu/future-nursing/are-
residencies-future-nurse-practitioner-training#sthash.mROjZli6.dpuf. 
 9  AM. ASS’N OF COLLEGES OF NURSING, THE DOCTOR OF NURSING PRACTICE (2013), 
http://www.aacn.nche.edu/media-relations/fact-sheets/DNPFactSheet.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2015).  The subjects of whether the Doctor of Nursing Practice (DNP) degree 
should be a prerequisite to APRN status, and the AMA’s “Truth in Advertising” 
campaign focusing on allegedly misleading applications of the DNP degree are not 
addressed in this Note. 
 10  See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6, at 8. 
 11  Id.; see also AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS, QUALIFICATIONS AND CAPABILITIES OF 
THE CERTIFIED REGISTERED NURSE ANESTHETIST, http://www.aana.com/ceandeducation/ 
becomeacrna/Pages/Qualifications-and-Capabilities-of-the-Certified-Registered-
Nurse-Anesthetist-.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). 
 12  See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6, at 8. 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
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treatment of health/illness states, disease management, health 
promotion, and prevention of illness and risk behaviors among 
individuals, families, groups, and communities,” integrating care 
between and among the three spheres of influence: patient, nurse, 
and system.15  The CNS concept was developed in World War II, 
when the need emerged to have highly qualified nurses involved in 
patient care.16  His or her primary goal is to improve patient 
outcomes and the quality of nursing care, and while the CNS has 
traditionally worked in hospitals, the role is expanding into nursing 
homes, schools, home care, and hospice.17  Historically, the CNS 
role has been subject to ambiguity, and CNSs have assumed many 
different responsibilities, including “staff and patient educator, 
consultant, supervisor, project director, and more recently, case 
manager.”18 
NPs are perhaps the most recognizable of the four APRN roles, 
and they are especially ubiquitous in their areas of specialty.  NPs 
“diagnose; develop differential diagnoses; order, conduct, supervise, 
and interpret diagnostic and laboratory tests; and prescribe 
pharmacologic and nonpharmacologic treatments in the direct 
management of acute and chronic illness and disease,” and they 
perform all of these tasks across virtually every medical specialty and 
subspecialty.19  NPs may practice autonomously or in collaboration 
with other healthcare professionals.20 
B. APRN Training 
Regarding the sufficiency of APRN education and training, the 
American Association of Nurse Practitioners (“AANP”) highlights 
the fact that nursing students start their formal healthcare education 
before entering graduate school (as opposed to physicians, who 
begin that work in medical school).  This training includes “physical 
assessment skills, interpreting diagnostic test results, [and] 
evaluating the appropriateness of medications and patients’ 
responses to treatments in both hospital and community settings.”21  
 
 15  Id. at 8-9. 
 16  Michalene Jansen et al., Advanced Practice Nursing 20 (4th ed. Springer Publ’g 
2009). 
 17  See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
 18  See Jansen, supra note 16. 
 19  Id. at 16; What’s an NP?, AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS (Mar. 15, 2015), 
http://www.aanp.org/all-about-nps/what-is-an-np. 
 20  See What’s an NP?, supra note 19.  
 21  Clinical Outcomes: The Yardstick of Educational Effectiveness, AM. ASSOC. OF NURSE 
PRACTITIONERS (Mar. 15, 2015), http://www.aanp.org/images/documents/publications 
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The AANP observes further that nursing education is based upon 
competency, rather than time spent in school.22  Indeed, the AANP 
quoted a physician from the American Academy of Family 
Physicians (“AAFP”)—an organization that actively opposes scope 
of practice reform—criticizing the current method in medical 
education of using time in school, rather than competency, as the 
yardstick for measuring successful education.23 
C. APRN Regulation 
In many states, APRNs are restricted by local regulatory 
schemes that prevent them from practicing to the full extent of their 
education.  Specifically, “scope of practice,” a term used with all 
licensed health practitioners, describes “the rules, the regulations, 
and the boundaries within which a fully qualified practitioner with 
substantial and appropriate training, knowledge, and experience 
may practice in a field of medicine or surgery, or other specifically 
defined field.”24  Under the current regulatory scheme in most states, 
even though APRNs receive training that qualifies them to practice 
in areas beyond these limits, they are either entirely denied the right 
 
/clinicaloutcomesyardstick.pdf.  
 22  Id. 
 23  Id.  The physician told AAFP News Now,  
Both in medical student education and residency, we have clung to the 
belief that if you spend a certain amount of time learning about 
something, then you must know it.  That’s as ridiculous as thinking that 
a teenager should be given a [driver’s] license just because he or she spent 
a set number of hours behind the wheel of a car. 
Id.; see also Anna-Lena Nieminen, Bodil Mannevaara & Lisbeth Fagerström, Advanced 
Practice Nurses’ Scope of Practice: A Qualitative Study of Advanced Clinical 
Competencies, 25 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF CARING SCI. 662, 661-670 (2011): 
Many researchers relate RNs’ clinical competence to the nurse-patient 
relationship while relating the quality of nursing care to a population’s 
health needs [].  The description of clinical competence varies from tasks 
to be done to a holistic view that includes knowledge, skills, ability, and 
ethical conduct [].  Several researchers emphasize that both practical and 
theoretical knowledge are part of professional clinical competence [].  
Clinical competence is based on a nurse’s ability to integrate nursing 
science and other sciences into his/her clinical competence [].  The 
practical knowledge in clinical nursing care is also formed through role 
models [].  An RN’s clinical competence consists of his/her personal 
ability and capability in implementing knowledge in different nursing 
contexts and situations in cooperation with others. 
Id.  
 24  FED’N OF STATE MED. BOARDS, ASSESSING SCOPE OF PRACTICE IN HEALTH CARE 
DELIVERY: CRITICAL QUESTIONS IN ASSURING PUBLIC ACCESS AND SAFETY (2005), 
http://library.fsmb.org/pdf/2005_grpol_scope_of_practice.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 
2015). 
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to do so, or must work under restrictive collaborative agreements, 
wherein they ostensibly are supervised by a physician.25  As I will 
demonstrate in this Note, these regulatory schemes have nothing to 
do with empirical evidence regarding patient outcomes, 
competency, or malpractice concerns; rather, they are simply an 
outgrowth of unsubstantiated and misleading claims by physicians’ 
groups that the traditional system of physician-led healthcare teams 
must be preserved. 
i. Expanding Scope of Practice - Access 
The current impetus for APRN scope of practice expansion is 
the gap in access to quality medical care, especially primary care.  
The number of physicians entering into primary care or internal 
medicine is steadily decreasing, while the number of nurse 
practitioners (“NPs”) is increasing.26  The AMA has cited experts 
predicting a shortage of more than 45,000 primary care physicians 
by 2020.27  This shortage is attributed to several factors: increased 
demand for healthcare brought on by the aging of the “baby 
boomer” generation, the influx of newly insured Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”) beneficiaries, decreased supply resulting from a large class 
of primary care physicians retiring (also baby boomers), and the 
decreased interest from medical students in primary care, largely due 
to low reimbursement rates.28  While there is disagreement over the 
extent of the shortage, experts agree that poor urban and rural areas 
are most affected.29 APRNs, if untethered from supervising 
 
 25  AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS, GUIDELINES ON THE SUPERVISION OF CERTIFIED 
NURSE MIDWIVES, NURSE PRACTITIONERS AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS (2008), 
http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/news/NP_Info_GlinesNP-060710.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2015); Joanne Pohl et al., The Latest Data On Primary Care Nurse 
Practitioners And Physicians: Can We Afford To Waste Our Workforce?, HEALTH AFFAIRS 
BLOG (Jun. 18 2013) (“More than half the states require physician supervision or 
collaboration for an NP to practice, despite the lack of any data to support the need for 
such a regulation”).  
 26  Mary D. Naylor & Ellen T. Kurtzman, The Role of Nurse Practitioners in Reinventing 
Primary Care, 29 Health Aff. 893, 893-94 (2010). 
 27  Press Release, American Medical Assoc., AMA Urges Continued Support for 
Adequate Graduate Medical Education Funding to Meet Future Physician Workforce 
Needs (July 29, 2014), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/news/ 
2014/2014-07-29-support-graduate-medical-education-funding.page. 
 28  Mark D. Schwartz, Health Care Reform and the Primary Care Workforce 
Bottleneck, 27 J. of Gen. Internal Med. 469, 469-72 (2012); Stephen C. Schimpff, Why 
is there a shortage of primary care physicians?, KEVINMD.COM (Feb. 17, 2014), 
http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/02/shortage-primary-care-physicians.html.  
 29  The Editorial Bd., Bottlenecks in Training Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2014  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/opinion/sunday/bottlenecks-in-training-
doctors.html?_r=1 (last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
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physicians, would be able to expand into rural areas that physicians 
eschew.30  Currently, 18% of NPs practice in such rural areas, while 
CNMs attend a “substantial portion of births” and CRNAs are the 
sole anesthesia providers in 85% of those rural areas.31  This is 
possible because in many of these rural states, scope of practice for 
APRNs has already been expanded to allow a more liberal 
collaborative agreement, or collaborative agreements have been 
entirely eliminated, allowing full scope of practice.32 
ii. Economic Benefits 
The other impetus for legislation is the possible economic 
benefits of expanded scope, though even the IOM report concedes 
that an analysis of those benefits is problematic.33  However, one 
study in 2009 projected that Massachusetts (which at the time was 
the only state to have passed sweeping healthcare legislation) could 
save $4.2 billion to $8.4 billion on healthcare between 2010-2020 
by expanding scope of practice for NPs.34  That study further 
proposed that encouraging the use of CNMs for low-risk 
pregnancies and CRNAs for certain surgeries could similarly reduce 
costs.35  Linked to this finding is the proposal, in the same report, 
that the promotion of “retail clinics”— i.e., clinics found in retail 
shopping centers and drug stores—could save the state $6 billion 
between 2010-2020.36  The economic benefit stems from the fact 
that NPs generally staff such clinics, though they would need full 
prescriptive privileges for the state to realize these gains.37  It should 
be noted, however, that the economic motive is secondary to the 
overall goal of promoting both access to care and quality of care, 
and since part of the agenda for APRNs is to achieve parity of 
reimbursement with physicians for equal service, the economic 
benefit could ultimately prove negligible.38 
 
 30  Sylvia Smith, Nurse Practitioners Fill the Gap, AARP THE MAGAZINE, AARP.ORG, 
(Aug.-Sept., 2014), http://www.aarp.org/health/healthy-living/info-2014/nurse-
practitioners-fill-the-gap.html. 
 31  Kelly A. Goudreau et al., HEALTH POLICY AND ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSING 33 
(Springer Publ’g 2013). 
 32  See discussion, Part III, infra. 
 33  IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-8. 
 34  Christine E. Eibner et al., Controlling Health Care Spending in Massachusetts: An 
Analysis of Options, 103-04 (Rand 2009). 
 35  Id. at 108. 
 36  Id. at 87. 
 37  Id. at 85. 
 38  Patricia L. Starck, The Cost of Doing Business in Nursing Education, 21 J. of Prof. 
Nursing 183, 185 (2005); IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at S-8. 
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III. LEGISLATING SCOPE OF PRACTICE BARRIERS 
A. Federal Legislation 
The IOM report makes separate recommendations for federal 
and state legislative action. Regarding federal action, it 
recommends: (1) expanding Medicare to cover APRN services 
currently allowed under state law, as PCPs are covered, and at the 
same rates; (2) amending Medicare to authorize certain APRN 
admitting privileges and certifications; (3) extending the ACA 
Medicaid reimbursement increases for primary care physicians to 
cover APRN services; and (4) limiting federal funding for nursing 
programs only to states that have adopted the National Council of 
State Boards of Nursing (“NCSBN”) advanced practice registered 
nurse model rules and regulations.39 
i. Expanding Medicare 
Current Medicare Conditions of Participation (“Conditions”) 
enable CRNAs and CNMs to perform services without a 
collaboration agreement with physicians in order to be reimbursed, 
though neither will necessarily receive reimbursement equal to that 
of a physician performing the same procedure.40  By contrast, the 
Conditions require that an NP or a CNS must work in collaboration 
with a physician, despite the existence of a more permissive state 
scope of practice scheme.41  Medicare reimburses the NP or CNS up 
to 85% of what a physician would earn for the same service.42  The 
committee advising Congress on the matter has not provided an 
analytical justification for the difference in reimbursement rates.43  
Since insurance companies take their cues from Medicare regarding 
 
 39  Id.; see Consensus Model for APRN Regulation: Licensure, Accreditation, Certification 
& Education, APRN JOINT DIALOGUE GROUP REPORT, July 7, 2008, at 7, available at 
http://www.aacn.nche.edu/education-resources/APRNReport.pdf; see also Robert 
Pear, As Medicaid Rolls Swell, Cuts in Payments to Doctors Threaten Access to Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/28/us/obamacare-
medicaid-fee-increases-expiring.html?_r=2 (last visited Mar. 17, 2015) (the increased 
reimbursement expired on December 31, 2014). 
 40  Dep’t of Health and Human Services Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
MEDICARE INFORMATION FOR ADVANCED PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES, ANESTHESIOLOGIST 
ASSISTANTS, AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS (2011). 
 41  At-a-Glance Billing Guidelines, TEX. MED. ASS’N., http://www.texmed.org/ 
Template.aspx?id=2273 (last visited Mar. 17, 2015). 
 42  Id. 
 43  Amanda Cassidy, Nurse Practitioners and Primary Care, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Oct. 25, 
2012, http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=79. (“The 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, the federal agency that advises Congress on 
Medicare issues, found that there was no analytical foundation for this difference.”). 
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reimbursement rates for APRN services, an increase in the Medicare 
reimbursement rate could therefore affect the insurance 
reimbursement rate.44 
ii. Amending Medicare 
The goal to amend Medicare was introduced because, as it is 
currently written, Medicare will only allow a physician (not an 
APRN) to certify patients for, among other things, home health and 
hospice care.45  This kind of care allows Medicare recipients to 
receive certain personal care services—including end of life and 
palliative care—at home, rather than in an extended-stay hospital or 
nursing home.46  Approximately 33% of Medicare beneficiaries 
experienced some kind of adverse effect as a result of a stay at a 
skilled nursing home.47  Furthermore, the vast majority of seniors 
favor granting more access for the elderly and infirm to at-home 
care.48  Giving APRNs the ability to certify this type of care would 
improve access and expediency for this service.49  Once again, 
Congress has failed to act in this regard. 
iii. Reimbursement 
The third IOM recommendation called for extending to APRNs 
the ACA reimbursement for primary care physicians.  The provision 
in question increased mandatory Medicaid rates paid to certain 
primary care physicians to equal the rates paid by Medicare for the 
same services.50  This provision expired in 2014, however, after an 
 
 44  Lorraine Bock, Changing Reimbursement Policies, ADVANCE HEALTHCARE NETWORK 
FOR NPS AND PAS, http://nurse-practitioners-and-physician-assistants.advanceweb.com 
/Article/Changing-Reimbursement-Policies.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2015); see also 42 
U.S.C.S. § 1395b-6 (LexisNexis 2015) (establishing the Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, which advises Congress on payment policies under Medicare).  
 45  42 U.S.C.S. § 1395f (LexisNexis 2015); see also Sarah Kliff, Obamacare is ramping 
up a health-care turf war, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/27/how-obamacare-is-ramping-up-a-health-care-turf-
war/. 
 46  Andrea Brassard, Removing Barriers to Advanced Practice Registered Nurse Care: 
Home Health and Hospice Services, 66 INSIGHT ON THE ISSUES 1, 2 (July 2012), available at 
http://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/research/public_policy_institute/health/remo
ving-barriers-advanced-practice-registered-nurse-home-health-hospice-insight-july-
2012-AARP-ppi-health.pdf. 
 47  Adverse Events in Skilled Nursing Facilities: National Incidence Among Medicare 
Beneficiaries, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. 1, 17-22 
(2014), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-11-00370.pdf. 
 48  Brassard, supra note 45, at 4. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Dep’t of Health & Human Services Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 
BARBARITO FINAL FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2016  8:56 PM 
2015] THE NURSE WILL SEE YOU NOW 137 
extension failed to escape committee in the Republican-controlled 
Congress.51  This recommendation was essentially no different from 
other reimbursement equality provisions envisioned by the Report, 
except that its acceptance could have theoretically increased 
healthcare access in underserved areas. Many of the underserved 
receive their healthcare from Medicaid-funded community health 
centers.52  Those health centers receiving the benefit of Medicaid 
expansion granted by the ACA saw an increase in staff in all 
positions except NPs, even though NPs account for a large portion 
of the providers in such facilities.53 
Additionally, given the ACA’s use of the word “clinicians” 
rather than “physicians” in much of its language, there seems to be 
a presumption in favor of diversified healthcare practitioners.54  
Furthermore, the provision for Centers of Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation (“CMMI”) has presumably left the door open for the 
inclusion of APRNs in future projects, once the second round of 
funding for those projects begins.55 
iv. Limiting Federal Funding to Consensus Model States 
The fourth recommendation – limiting federal funding for 
nursing programs to those states that have adopted the NCBSN 
Consensus Model – is arguably the most effective tool to wrangle 
the states into uniformity on the issue of APRN scope of practice. 
The Consensus Model is the product of approximately four 
years of discussion between twenty-three nursing organizations and 
 
MEDICAID PROGRAM; PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES FURNISHED BY CERTAIN PRIMARY CARE 
PHYSICIANS AND CHARGES FOR VACCINE ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE VACCINES FOR CHILDREN 
PROGRAM 1, 3 (2009), http://www.beckersasc.com/docs/oldmedia/CMSFinalRulePCP 
Medicaid.pdf. 
 51  Pear, supra note 38, at 738. 
 52  Medicaid and Community Health Centers: The Relationship Between Coverage for 
Adults and Primary Care Capacity in Medically Underserved Communities, THE KAISER 
COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED 1, 2 (March 2012), https://kaiserfamily 
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8293.pdf. 
 53  Id.at 1-2. 
 54  Jansen, supra note 16, at 90.  
 55  Jansen, supra note 16, at 90.  The CMMI is a program within the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) created by the ACA, which allows more 
freedom for CMS to experiment with new and innovative approaches to healthcare.  
Innovations provided for in the legislation include, inter alia, insurance exchanges for 
those not covered by government or third party insurance programs, a Medicare 
accountable care organization pilot program, and a program to provide funding for the 
transitional care of patients being discharged from hospitals.  The funding for these 
programs is not necessarily limited to only physicians. 
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the National Council of State Boards of Nursing (“NCSBN”).56  The 
NCSBN is an independent, not-for-profit association through which 
state boards of nursing act to standardize certain practices affecting 
nursing professions.57  The NCSBN joined with these other nursing 
organizations to form the Consensus Model in order to rein in the 
chaotic nature of APRN regulation and implement a stable and 
systematic expression of the designation “APRN.”  This union finally 
brought together a coherent system that covers licensure, 
accreditation, certification, and education (“LACE”).58  The Model 
Act (for the practice of nursing) and Model Rules emerged from this 
effort.59  As states implement the consensus model, state regulation 
nationwide will move closer to uniformity in scope of practice 
regulation.60  Withholding federal funding for nursing education 
from those states that do not conform to the consensus model could 
be a very effective way to encourage state consensus; however, there 
is no sign at all of congressional action in this area. 
v. Spurring Action 
What exactly is needed to spur Congressional action to meet 
the IOM goals?  Healthcare is famously a huge source of contention 
in Congress, but nursing itself can be a bi-partisan issue.  A brief 
overview of the regions allowing expansive scope of practice 
compared with stricter jurisdictions shows that while the 
traditionally “red” Southeast region is, en masse, the most restrictive 
region, traditionally “blue” stronghold states like New York, New 
Jersey, and California are similarly restrictive.61  On the other hand, 
the Southwest (besides California) and the Northwest grant the 
most uniformly expansive scope of practice rights.62  The inference, 
given the demographics, is that the more rural states of the country 
(discounting the Southeast) are the most open to expansive scope 
of practice. 
 
 56  Jansen, supra note 16, at 57. 
 57  NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
 58  Jansen, supra note 16, at 59. 
 59  NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6.  
 60  NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org/ 
5397.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (map showing the current landscape of 
implementation). 
 61  BARTON ASSOCIATES, http://www.bartonassociates.com/nurse-practitioners/nurse 
-practitioner-scope-of-practice-laws/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2015) (interactive graphic 
representing each state’s scope of practice laws). 
 62  Id. 
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It would be absurd to account for this discrepancy by saying 
that APRNs are simply more qualified to deliver medical care in 
rural areas than in urban ones; therefore, more populous states 
ostensibly have some reason other than skepticism of the medical 
skill of APRNs in their limiting APRN scope of practice.  One reason 
could be that medical societies do not want APRNs to compete with 
physicians, which will be discussed in Part IV, infra.  In the 
meantime, the reason to hope for Congressional action is that the 
matter is bipartisan, and could be addressed without major partisan 
rancor, given enough public interest.  Of course, the great disparity 
between the amounts of lobbying money contributed by the 
American Nurses Association ($1,467,064 in 2014) versus the 
amount contributed by the AMA ($19,650,000 in 2014) may help 
to explain the reluctance of Congress to address the issue.63 
B. Recommendations for the States 
The IOM report recommends that state legislatures (1) reform 
scope of practice regulations to conform to the NCBSN Model Act 
and Rules; and (2) “Require third-party payers that participate in 
fee-for-service payment arrangements to provide direct 
reimbursement to [APRNs] who are practicing within their scope of 
practice under state law.”64  This means that private insurance 
companies would have to reimburse APRNs directly for specific 
services if those services fall within a state’s scope of practice for 
APRNs, rather than require a collaborative agreement with a 
physician. 
i. Reforming Scope of Practice Laws 
1. Collaborative Agreements 
A collaborative agreement is a tether that binds APRNs to a 
supervising physician.65  A typical collaborative agreement, such as 
the kind mandated in New Jersey, requires the APRN and the 
physician to establish joint protocols for the treatment of patients, 
and the immediate presence or electronic availability of the 
 
 63  OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?cycle=2014 
&id=D000000173 (last visited Mar. 19, 2015); Id. at http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000000068 (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
 64  IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at S-8.  
 65  CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., SCOPE OF PRACTICE FAQS FOR CONSUMERS, ADVANCED 
PRACTICE REGISTERED NURSES 1, 2, http://www.nacns.org/docs/toolkit/3A-
FAQScope.pdf. 
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collaborating physician.66  The more onerous statutes—like 
Missouri’s—contain stringent geographic proximity requirements 
and bi-monthly review of patient charts by supervising physicians.67  
The main issue with such agreements is that they potentially 
constrain the area in which an APRN can provide care, thus limiting 
consumers’ access, and restricting the APRN unnecessarily from full 
use of his or her training.68 
2. Regulatory Structure 
State statutes, along with regulations promulgated by state 
nursing boards, regulate nursing practice and scope.69  In addition, 
states have medical practice acts that may affect nursing scope of 
practice by limiting the practice of medicine to medical doctors 
exclusively.70  These can lead to murky territory, in which the exact 
scope of practice for APRNs is not fully delineated.71  It is therefore 
the province of state legislatures to enact reforms to scope of practice 
laws.  Consequently, it is in state legislatures where most of the 
battles over expanded scope are fought.  The ultimate goal of APRN 
advocates for this legislation is to achieve full scope of practice for 
APRNs independent of collaborative agreements.72 
3. The Consensus Model for State Regulation 
The NCBSN tracks how compliant the states are with the 
Consensus Model.73  There are eleven states and one territory with a 
perfect NCSBN score for compliance.74  Iowa practically achieved a 
perfect score, since the only requirement not met is the actual 
“APRN” title (Iowa’s designation is “Advanced Registered Nurse 
Practitioner” or “ARNP”).75  However, the moniker “APRN” has 
some legal significance for those practitioners who work across state 
 
 66  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:11-49 (West 2015); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 13:35-6.6 (West 2015) 
(regulates the standards for joint protocols). 
 67  MO. REV. STAT. § 334.104 (LexisNexis 2015). 
 68  CITIZEN ADVOCACY CTR., supra note 65, at 2. 
 69  Karla Kelly, Nurse Practitioner Challenges to the Orthodox Structure of Health Care 
Delivery: Regulation and Restraints on Trade, 11 AM. J. L. & MED. 195, 199 (1985). 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 201-203. 
 72  See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, https://www.ncsbn.org/ 
738.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
 73  See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra, note 60. 
 74  Id. 
 75  Iowa Board of Nursing, The Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner, IOWA.GOV, 
https://nursing.iowa.gov/practice/advanced-registered-nurse-practitioner-role-scope 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2015).  
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lines.76  A perfect score means that the state or territory has adopted 
all four APRN titles and roles (CNP, CRNA, CNM, CNS), licensing, 
education, and certification requirements, and most relevant to the 
immediate discussion, allows independent practice and 
independent prescribing without written collaboration agreements.77  
A poor score means that the state has not adopted the nomenclature 
and does not allow independent practice.  Among the lowest scoring 
states are New Jersey, Michigan, Florida, and Alabama.78  In between 
are states that, inter alia, allow independent practice but not 
independent prescriptive rights (Wisconsin), or fully meet all 
licensing and title specifications but allow no independence 
(Texas), or give expanded rights to some APRNs, but not others 
(North Carolina).79 
a. New Jersey Scope of Practice Reform 
New Jersey’s main sponsor of a bill eliminating collaborative 
agreements cites a rural New Jersey APRN who was the primary 
provider for “thousands of patients” as an example of the need for 
the legislation.  This APRN had to stop providing care when her 
supervising physician retired.80  Introduced in 2012 by 
Assemblywoman Munoz, the New Jersey Consumer Access to 
Healthcare Act (“Bill”) would bring sweeping change to New Jersey’s 
scope of practice for APRNs.81  Specifically, it would eliminate the 
need for any collaborative agreement between any APRN (all roles) 
and a physician, and it would also allow full prescriptive privileges 
for qualifying APRNs.82  This would bring New Jersey up to almost 
complete compliance with the Model Rules; the only non-
compliant portion is that the proposed act continues to refer to the 
 
 76  Tracy Klein, State Implementation of the APRN Consensus Model, HEALTH POLICY 
AND ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSING: IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS 327 (Kelly A. Goudreau & 
Mary Smolenski eds., 2013) (“Lack of uniform titling provided several disadvantages 
to APRNs who are required to use state-protected titles in business communications, 
particularly when practice is located across state lines.”). 
 77  See Major Components of the Consensus Model by State, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE 
BOARDS OF NURSING (2014), https://www.ncsbn.org/2014.07_18_Julymapwith 
points.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (contains a chart that shows the points system 
and each state’s score). 
 78  NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra, note 60. 
 79  NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra, note 75. 
 80  Lisette Hilton, New York/New Jersey legislation could test APN ‘tether’, NURSE.COM 
(June 3, 2013), http://news.nurse.com/article/20130603/NY01/106030005#.VGFKb 
_TF-EM.  
 81  Assemb. B. 906, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014).  
 82  Id. 
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subject as Advanced Practice Nurses (“APN”), rather than APRN.83 
The Executive Committee of the New Jersey Board of Medical 
Examiners opposed the Senate version of the Bill, expressing its 
opposition based upon three main concerns: that under certain 
circumstances a physician should be brought in to give treatment, 
and the Bill erodes those circumstances; that the Bill could result in 
raised medical malpractice insurance premiums for physicians; and 
that consumers should be advised as to who (i.e., the actual role of 
the practitioner and her education and title) is actually providing 
healthcare.84  As to the first complaint, there is no explanation as to 
why a physician could not be brought in if needed, even under the 
new language of the Act.85  The Act does not command APRNs to 
never contact a physician; it simply seeks to expand the scope of 
practice to the extent of training.  It should also be noted that even 
physicians have a duty to refer patients whose care exceeds their 
competence, and face malpractice suits if they fail in that duty; 
therefore, there is no reason that APRNs should not face the same 
liability.86 
Regarding the second objection, there does not appear to be 
evidence that relaxed licensing laws cause malpractice premiums to 
increase.  According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
for example, while restrictive scope of practice laws tend to lead to 
greater healthcare costs, more liberal laws lead to no change in 
malpractice premiums.87  Other sources show similar results.88  
However, this is an evolving area of the law, and its breadth cannot 
be covered in this Note. 
 
 83  Id. 
 84  New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners, Open Board Agenda (Jan. 13, 2013), 
http://www.njconsumeraffairs.gov/bme/Agendas/bmeage_010913.pdf.  
 85  See David Gorski, Expanding the scope of practice of advanced practice nurses will not 
endanger patients, SCIENCE-BASED MEDICINE (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.sciencebased 
medicine.org/expanding-the-scope-of-practice-of-advanced-practice-nurses-does-not-
endanger-patients/ (“What happens when a physician encounters something in the 
course of diagnosis or treatment that goes very wrong and he doesn’t have the training 
to handle it?  He calls in other physicians who can handle it!”). 
 86  See Tine Hansen-Turton et al., Nurse Practitioners in Primary Care, 82 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1235, 1251-52 (2010).  This area of the law is changing rapidly.  This Note will 
not further address the issue, as it deserves much greater attention than can be given 
here. 
 87  See Morris M. Kleiner et al., Relaxing Occupational Licensing Requirements: 
Analyzing Wages and Prices for a Medical Service, 1, 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 19906, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19906.pdf. 
 88  APRN Scope of Practice: Access to Care and Medical Malpractice, MICHIGAN COUNCIL 
OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS, http://www.micnp.org/files/Comparison%20of%20other% 
20states%20sheet.pdf. 
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As to the objection that the public would not be adequately 
advised as to who provides their healthcare, that objection 
essentially tracks the AMA’s “Truth in Advertising” campaign.89  That 
campaign ostensibly seeks to keep healthcare consumers informed 
about who is providing their healthcare, but could effectively work 
to punish nurses who may legitimately lay claim to the title 
“Doctor,” such as APRNs who also have achieved a doctorate 
degree.90  While patients have a legitimate concern in knowing their 
provider’s qualifications, the proposed legislation in that campaign 
is largely duplicative of current state legislation.91  It would treat 
clinicians unequally, applying standards to nurses that are not 
applied to physicians.92 
b. Other States’ Efforts 
The continuing objections in other states echo the same themes 
as those in New Jersey.  The Michigan State Medical Society calls its 
state’s scope of nursing practice proposal “unproven and 
controversial.”93  While it is controversial, because medical societies 
keep objecting to it, it is obviously not unproven, given the breadth 
of similar laws already enacted.94  Florida’s bill proposal would 
allow APRNs (in Florida, ARNPs) to practice independently, and to 
prescribe controlled substances and narcotics, leading the Florida 
Medical Association to insinuate that Florida would “move 
backwards” in its fight to curb prescription medicine abuse.95  The 
Association cited no study supporting its insinuation, nor is the 
contention supported elsewhere.96  That bill subsequently died in 
committee.97 The Massachusetts Medical Society also toes the line 
 
 89  See generally AMA ADVOCACY RES. CTR., “TRUTH IN ADVERTISING” CAMPAIGN 1, 2 
(AM. MED. 2012). 
 90  Learn the Truth about AMA’s Truth in Advertising Campaign, NATIONAL ASS’N OF 
CLINICAL NURSE SPECIALISTS, http://www.nacns.org/docs/TruthTransparencyTalking 
Points.pdf. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Put Patients First! Urge Your State Rep to Vote NO on Senate Bill 2, MICHIGAN STATE 
MED. SOC’Y. (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.msms.org/AboutMSMS/News/tabid/178/ID/ 
1375/Put-Patients-First-Urge-Your-State-Rep-to-Vote-NO-on-Senate-Bill-2.aspx.  
 94  See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE BOARDS OF NURSING, supra note 77. 
 95  Scope of Practice Expansion, A Prescription for Trouble, FLORIDA MED. ASS’N., 
http://www.flmedical.org/Stop_7113.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
 96  Id.  
 97  H.B. 7071, House of Representatives, (Fl. 2014), available at http://www. 
myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=52482 (last visited Mar. 20, 
2015). 
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set by the AMA, “arguing [expanded scope of practice] was contrary 
to an optimal physician-led, team-based healthcare delivery model 
and was a possible threat to patient safety.”98  Once again, it referred 
to no study revealing a possible threat.99 
As demonstrated above, while legislation on the issue is active 
in many states, states’ medical societies oppose expanded scope of 
practice.100  Most of those medical societies have significant 
lobbying influence.101  Consequently, much of the scope of practice 
legislation on the slate for 2014 died, whether in committee, by 
vote, or by veto.102  Expanded scope of practice is getting a hearing 
in the states, but the opposition, coming almost solely from 
physicians’ groups, is as fierce as it is unfounded. 
4. An Emerging Strategy 
Perhaps the best plan for APRN advocates is a piecemeal 
strategy.  The legislation that has been struck down largely proposes 
sweeping changes that immediately conform to the Model Act.103  
However, the comments made by Nebraska Governor Dave 
Heineman when he vetoed that state’s APRN reform bill suggest that 
a different approach might work.  In addition to his statement about 
conferring with his chief medical officer, Governor Heineman spoke 
of his willingness to enact smaller changes.104  Tying independence 
to some sort of clinical experience regime that will eventually be 
understood as a residency or its equivalent may lead to successful 
legislation.  In New Jersey, while the aforementioned Consumer 
Access to Healthcare bill has not moved forward, Assemblywoman 
 
 98  Statehouse Update: Practice Expansion for APNs Rejected, MASSACHUSETTS MED. SOC., 
(Aug. 2014) http://www.massmed.org/News-and-Publications/Vital-Signs/Statehouse-
Update--Practice-Expansion-for-APNs-Rejected/#.Vpq4lPkrK70 (last visited Mar. 20, 
2015). 
 99  Id. 
 100  See, e.g., FLORIDA MED. ASS’N., supra note 95; MICHIGAN STATE MED. SOC’Y., supra 
note 93; New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners, supra note 84, at 2-3.  
 101  Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap Between Can and May in Health-Care Providers’ 
Scopes of Practice: A Primer for Policymakers, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 301, 304 (2002) 
(“Whenever scope-of-practice issues arise, legislators are bombarded by heavily-
financed lobbying efforts emanating from state and national professional associations, 
individual health care providers (who are also voters), and interested citizens.”). 
 102  AANP gives thumbs down to Nebraska veto of NP practice bill, NURSE.COM (Apr. 24, 
2014) http://news.nurse.com/article/20140424/NATIONAL06/140424001#. 
VGKktvTF-EM (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (stating that after conference with his chief 
medical advisor, Nebraska’s Governor vetoed the expanded practice bill passed 
unanimously by his legislature). 
 103  See NCSBN CONSENSUS MODEL, supra note 6.  
 104  NURSE.COM, supra note 102. 
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Munoz successfully passed a bill allowing APRNs to determine a 
patient’s cause of death.105  Furthermore, as previously stated, 
successful scope of practice expansion has been achieved when the 
legislation requires nurses to have a certain threshold of clinical 
experience within a collaborative agreement scheme before they 
may be un-tethered and strike out on their own.106  These examples 
show that when it comes to passing laws in this context, some states 
prefer incremental, rather than comprehensive, change, and adding 
mandated hours of clinical experience may be the middle ground 
that ushers in more successful legislation.107 
ii. Reimbursement from Third Party Payers 
Finally, the IOM report recommends that states require third 
party payers to reimburse APRNs directly.108  This provision was 
added because “few if any third-party payors recognize nursing 
services that are not bundled with medical management and, 
therefore, nursing services are not directly reimbursed.”109  In short, 
nurses cannot get paid unless a physician who does the billing on 
their behalf is supervising them.  Consequently, APRNs received 
reimbursement “indirectly, incident to physicians, and at a 
considerably lower rate.”110  Such reimbursement schemes create a 
de facto tether to physicians. Independence issues aside, the 
outcomes for patients tend to improve with intervention from 
nurses, and without an accounting mechanism for nurse 
intervention that direct reimbursement could supply, valuable care 
may be lost.111 
Private third party insurers are regulated by the individual 
states.112  Federal mandates that typically govern third party 
 
 105  Press Release, New Jersey Assembly Republicans, Gov. Signs Muñoz Bill 
Allowing APNs to Determine Cause of Death (May 4, 2015) (on file with author). 
 106  See, e.g., Adam Rubenfire, Some N.Y. Nurse Practitioners to be Freed of Doc 
Supervision in 2015, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Dec. 30, 2014) http://www.modern 
healthcare.com/article/20141230/NEWS/312309974/some-n-y-nurse-practitioners-
to-be-freed-of-doc-supervision-in-2015 (last visited Mar. 20, 2015) (discussing New 
York law conditioning independent practice upon 3,600 hours of clinical experience). 
 107  Jansen, supra note 16, at 394. 
 108  IOM FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at S-8. 
 109  Martha J. Price & Patricia H. Parkerton, Care Delivery Challenges for 
Nursing, 107 AM. J. OF NURSING (2007), available at http://journals.lww.com/ajnonline/ 
Fulltext/2007/06001/Care_Delivery_Challenges_for_Nursing.22.aspx. 
 110  ANN B. HAMRIC ET AL., ADVANCED PRACTICE NURSING: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 569 
(Elsevier Health Sciences ed., 5th ed. 2013). 
 111  Price & Parkerton, supra note 109. 
 112  HAMRIC ET AL., supra note 110, at 569. 
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reimbursement in the realm of Medicare and Medicaid are often 
blocked by discriminatory rules and regulations regarding “non-
physician” and “mid-level” providers.113  Thus, there is an arbitrary 
reimbursement system in place that discriminates against APRNs, 
without regard for patient outcomes.  This proposition invokes the 
philosophical question of whether providers are paid for the quality 
of their outcomes, or the quality, quantity, and cost of their 
educations, to wit: should a physician receive more reimbursement 
for her treatment of strep throat than a nurse practitioner for the 
exact same treatment, because the physician presumably has the 
greater education?  Under a fee-for-service regime, does perceived 
expertise have a bearing on outcomes?  Regardless of these more 
esoteric considerations, the point of the IOM recommendation is, 
presumably, to pay people directly for the healthcare they actually 
can provide, rather than filter that payment through unnecessary 
middlemen. 
IV. PHYSICIAN OPPOSITION AND ANTITRUST 
A. Physician Opposition and the Objective Evidence 
The main opposition to expanded scope of practice comes from 
contentions by physicians that APRNs do not receive adequate 
training to be entrusted with the ability to exercise the full extent of 
that training.  The AMA listed the disparity in clinical experience 
between doctors and nurses as its main opposition to the IOM 
report.114  In 2014, New York passed legislation expanding practice 
for registered nurse practitioners.115  One vocal opponent of that 
legislation cited the AMA verbatim in his scathing criticism of the 
new law.116  He further cited to a 1999 study suggesting that NPs 
may resort to more diagnostic tests, thus negating any economic 
benefits.117  However, no opposing party has actually cited to any 
research supporting the contention that APRNs provide inferior 
care; in fact, studies tend to show the opposite.  Specifically, a 
systematic review compiling nearly two decades of research found 
that “care delivered by APRNs and care delivered by physicians 
 
 113  Id. 
 114  Press Release, supra note 3. 
 115  Rubenfire, supra note 106. 
 116  Sandeep Jauhar, Nurses Are Not Doctors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/opinion/nurses-are-not-doctors.html?_r=2 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
 117  Id. 
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(alone or in teams without an APRN) produce equivalent patient 
outcomes.”118  Of course, this study focuses on the kinds of patients 
whom APRNs and physicians are qualified to treat in common; 
there are many high risk or severely compromised patients whom 
APRNs do not treat. 
The 2011 study, a meta-analysis examining 29 separate patient 
outcomes (as opposed to patient preferences) from a total of 69 
studies conducted over 18 years, demonstrated that in no category 
did patients experience more adverse outcomes under the care of 
APRNs than under that of physicians.119  In fact, APRNs’ patients 
presented more favorable outcomes in certain categories.120  In a 
2012 report critical of expanded scope of practice legislation, the 
Physicians Foundation—whose mission is to oppose expansion of 
non-physicians’ scope of practice—acknowledged that “[t]he 
research literature shows, without exception, that within their areas 
of training and experience, nurse practitioners provide care that is as 
good as or better than that provided by physicians.”121  The report 
goes on to question the validity of one of those studies, which it 
claims—without substantiation—is the definitive study on the 
topic, and fails to mention the above 2011 meta-analysis.122  The 
report suggests bias, observing (without providing evidence 
supporting the implication) that APRN advocates performed much 
of the research in the area.123 
This conflict of interest criticism intimated by the Physicians 
Foundation is ultimately disingenuous.  A 1986 policy analysis 
submitted to Congress by the now-defunct Office of Technology 
Assessment (“OTA”) found that “[t]he weight of the evidence 
 
 118  Goudreau et al., supra note 31, at 29-30; see also Jeffrey C. Bauer, Nurse 
Practitioners as an Underutilized Resource for Health Reform: Evidence-Based Demonstrations 
of Cost-effectiveness, 22 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS 228, 228-231 (2010). 
 119  Goudreau et al., supra note 31, at 29-30; see also E. Haavi Morreim, Playing 
Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and Medical Malpractice, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 
985 (1999) (“Outcomes studies are [a] kind of research intended to establish better 
correlations between what physicians do during clinical care and the results that 
patients actually experience, both long-and short-term”). 
 120  Goudreau et al., supra note 31, at 29-30. 
 121  STEPHEN ISAACS & PAUL JELLINEK, ACCEPT NO SUBSTITUTE: A REPORT ON SCOPE OF 
PRACTICE 1, 42 (The Physicians Found., Nov. 2012), 
http://www.physiciansfoundation.org/uploads/default/A_Report_on_Scope_of_Practi
ce.pdf. 
 122  Id. at 29.  
 123  Id.; While such a conflict of interest may present a negative connotation, the 
report fails to point to any research whatsoever in the area performed by anyone else 
who may be more neutral, and in fact lists as a goal for physicians, funding of such 
research.  
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indicates that, within their areas of competence, NPs . . . and CNMs 
provide care [the quality of which] is equivalent to that of care 
provided by physicians.”124  The OTA was committed to providing 
objective and non-partisan information to Congress; it was not 
prone to a pro-APRN bias.125  Though that report is nearly thirty 
years old, no apparent subsequent research refutes it, and it has been 
substantially upheld by later studies.126  While at the end of the day 
the report does not include the most recent areas of practice, taken 
with the 2011 study, and the acknowledgement of the Physicians 
Foundation that all empirical evidence points inexorably to the fact 
of equivalent patient outcomes, and lacking any evidence to the 
contrary, physicians appear to base their opposition not upon an 
objective scientific standard, but upon their own unsubstantiated 
prejudices.  Of course, it is quite possible that physicians view 
expanded scope of practice as a competitive threat to their business; 
if that is the case, then the issue demands antitrust analysis. 
B. Antitrust 
Antitrust law is about the competitive effects of certain types of 
conduct that potentially adversely affects the price, quality, and 
availability of a product—in this case healthcare—thereby 
impinging on the welfare of consumers.127  Physicians and APRNs 
are competitors, not because they offer the exact same services to the 
same populations, but because their services are potential 
substitutes.128  This is not to say that APRNs should replace 
physicians, nor that the competitors should not also collaborate, or 
even work for each other.129  Rather, all other factors being equal, 
this antitrust analysis seeks to expose harm to the consumer 
resulting from anticompetitive behavior which, but for under-
rationalized or arbitrary regulations put in place by one interested 
competitor and sanctioned by governments, would not occur. 
The IOM report speaks directly to matters of antitrust, where it 
 
 124  U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NURSE PRACTITIONERS, PHYSICIAN 
ASSISTANTS, AND CERTIFIED NURSE-MIDWIVES: A POLICY ANALYSIS, 37 Health Tech. Case 
Study 1, 5 (1986), http://ota.fas.org/reports/8615.pdf.  
 125  The OTA Legacy, PRINCETON UNIV., https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/ (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2015). 
 126  See, e.g., Goudreau et al., supra note 31, at 29-30. 
 127  See generally Daniel J. Gilman & Julie Fairman, Antitrust and the Future of Nursing: 
Federal Competition Policy and the Scope of Practice, 24 HEALTH MATRIX 143, 154-55 
(2014). 
 128  Id. at 156. 
 129  Id. at 157. 
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urges the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice to review current legislation 
and laws in the states for possible anticompetitive effects.130  
Furthermore, antitrust issues arise when one particular coalition of 
professionals gathers to undermine a perceived rival coalition’s 
ability to compete.131  In this case, the American Medical Association 
and the assorted State medical societies/associations make up 
coalitions, though their efforts may not reach the level of antitrust; 
or if they do, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine may protect those 
actions. Regarding legislation, the FTC has had a hand in guiding 
state legislatures away from passing anticompetitive laws.132  The 
advocacy function of the FTC may prove exceedingly influential, 
and the agency has certainly taken up the IOM’s call.133  The 
remainder of this Note will focus briefly on the FTC’s role in 
antitrust action, and then move into discussions of the Sherman Act 
generally, as well as the Noerr-Pennington and State Action 
doctrines, which are the primary limitations to antitrust action.  
Finally, this Note will address N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. 
FTC,134 a case recently decided by the Supreme Court, which bears 
on the issue. 
i. The FTC 
Regulatory restrictions on APRN scope of practice have drawn 
attention from the FTC’s competition advocacy program.135  The 
FTC’s interest in the issue is drawn from the FTC Act itself, which 
“prohibits ‘[u]nfair methods of competition’ and ‘unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices,’ and gives the FTC a mandate ‘to prevent 
persons, partnerships, or corporations’ from engaging in such 
prohibited methods, acts, and practices.”136  In the healthcare arena, 
the FTC has “investigated restrictions on the business practices of 
healthcare providers, scrutinized proposed mergers, and brought 
enforcement actions against healthcare providers that have violated 
federal competition law.”137  Subsequent congressional legislation 
has enhanced the Commission, such that “[e]conomic and policy 
 
 130  FUTURE OF NURSING REPORT, supra note 1, at S-8-S-9.  
 131  See Discussion, infra Part IV.B.ii. 
 132  Gilman & Fairman, supra note 127, at 153-54. 
 133  Id. 
 134  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 191 L. Ed. 2d 35 (U.S. 2015). 
 135  Gilman & Fairman, supra note 127, at 144. 
 136  Id. at 149. 
 137  Id. 
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research and competition advocacy . . . are at the core of the FTC’s 
statutory mission, alongside the Commission’s civil law 
enforcement responsibilities.”138 
The result is an FTC that may influence and enforce policy.  
Substantial challenges exist to enforcing competition through 
litigation, such that the FTC cannot always act as a litigious sword 
in the hands of regulators, but must instead sometimes work more 
passively, through legislatures and legislators, to promote 
competition policy at a formative level.139  The FTC’s role in this 
context has been discussed comprehensively elsewhere, and will not 
be further discussed at length here.140 
ii. The Sherman Act, Section 1, Generally 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal, and criminalizes 
contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade.141  A section 1 claimant 
must initially prove three elements: (1) an agreement or conspiracy 
between at least two persons or distinct business entities; (2) to 
harm or restrain competition; (3) which actually injures 
competition.142  Opposition to expanding the scope of APRN 
practice seems like a deceptively simple, per se instance of restraint 
of trade by the AMA and other medical societies, or state boards of 
medicine: (1) physicians make up such societies or boards, and are 
persons or distinct business entities within the meaning of the 
statute, and have obviously agreed to work together in this regard,143 
(2) their agreement is to advocate for policies, which work to the 
detriment of APRN competition with them, and (3) this harms 
consumers, since without the ability to practice to the full extent of 
their scope, APRNs cannot offer their services, even when those 
services match those of competing physicians.  Antitrust may be 
unavailing in this context, though, because of two doctrines: the 
 
 138  Id. at 150, see also Maureen K. Ohlhausen, 17th Annual Antitrust Symposium: 100 
is the New 30: Recommendations for the FTC’s Next 100 Years, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1131, 1132 (“The FTC should always consider the many non-enforcement tools it can 
use to help stop consumer harm before it arises, thus sparing consumers and businesses 
unnecessary losses and saving the taxpayer money that we would otherwise spend on 
litigation.”). 
 139  See generally Gilman & Fairman, supra note 127. 
 140  Id. 
 141  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2015). 
 142  Oltz v. Saint Peter’s Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 143  See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 200 (2010) 
(“Agreements made within a firm can constitute concerted action . . . when the parties 
to the agreement act on interests separate from those of the firm itself” such that “the 
intrafirm agreements may simply be a formalistic shell for ongoing concerted action”). 
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State Action Doctrine and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine. 
iii. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
Briefly, the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine protects the First 
Amendment right of citizens, including trade groups, to earnestly 
petition the government to adopt a particular course of action, “no 
matter how anticompetitive the action sought.”144  Its reach is 
sweeping, covering all three branches of government, as well as 
administrative agencies.145  In Eastern Railroad Conference v. Noerr 
Motor Freight,146 the case from which the doctrine takes its name, 
“railroads were genuinely lobbying the legislature for laws that 
would favor them at the expense of their competitors,” which, given 
the First Amendment right to petition and our common 
understanding of representative government, is a fairly intuitive 
right to afford protection.147  United Mine Workers of America v. 
Pennington148 was a similarly intuitive case, extending Noerr 
immunity to petitions of the Executive.149  Finally, California Motor 
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited150 extended Noerr-Pennington 
immunity to entities interacting with the courts and administrative 
agencies, but applied the “sham” exception for the first time.151  The 
“sham” exception stands for the principle that “when efforts to 
influence government action are considered ‘sham,’ the petition is 
stripped of its immunity.”152  In other words, immunity is lost when 
advocacy efforts are an obvious charade, not pursued in good faith, 
but rather pursued as a means to obfuscate otherwise prohibited 
intentions. 
Observed in light of the sham exception, physicians’ 
organizations’ efforts to petition the legislature against APRN scope 
of practice are suspect.  Assuming that physicians’ societies and 
boards deserve the benefit of the doubt regarding their good faith 
belief that APRNs are insufficiently trained or competent to practice 
independently, one might think that they are being deliberately 
 
 144  Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 
RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 966 (2003). 
 145  Id.  
 146  365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 147  Id.; Lao, supra note 144, at 974. 
 148  381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
 149  Id.; Lao, supra note 144, at 974-75. 
 150  404 U.S. 508 (1972). 
 151  Id.; Lao, supra note 144, at 975. 
 152  Lao, supra note 144, at 967; see, e.g., California Motor Transport Co., 404 U.S. at 
511-12. 
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obtuse regarding the objective research on APRN outcomes.  
However, the Supreme Court has eviscerated the sham exception to 
the point that it is essentially worthless in this context, even when 
Noerr-Pennington immunity stands to severely injure consumers.153 
In a legislative context, sham as an exception to Noerr-
Pennington is useless, even if it involves fraud or 
misrepresentation.154  Even if, hypothetically, interest groups 
petitioning legislatures do so in bad faith, and use entirely false data 
to support their positions, Noerr-Pennington is an absolute shield 
against antitrust liability.  There is simply no chance to pursue 
antitrust litigation in this context, nor is this Note meant to propose 
changes to the doctrine. 
Nonetheless, the sham exception remains robust in the context 
of litigation or administrative processes.155  Unfortunately, how this 
may apply to the immediate matter is unclear.  The AMA and other 
such organizations are not bringing lawsuits against APRNs to 
enjoin their practice; if they were, then the sham exception might 
apply.  Instead, there are currently physicians serving on state 
medical boards, whose recommendations defining the practice of 
medicine become the law.  As state appointees, those regulators are 
shielded by the State Action Doctrine, and are thus immune from 
antitrust action.  However, a new exception, recently delineated and 
discussed infra, may change this situation. 
iv. The State Action Doctrine 
The State Action Doctrine, in the antitrust context, reinforces 
the principles of federalism immunizing state action from antitrust 
challenge.  Thus, a state agency may theoretically engage in 
anticompetitive behavior without the risk of antitrust action, 
though it should be noted that “a state cannot ‘give immunity to 
those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate 
it, or by declaring that their action is lawful.’”156 
The state agencies of concern to this Note are boards of 
medicine, which define the scope of the practice of medicine for a 
 
 153  Lao, supra note 144, at 979. 
 154  See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365, 382 (1991). 
 155  Lao, supra note 144, at 988-89; see, e.g., Kottle v. N.W. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 
1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 1998); Baltimore Scrap Corp. v. David J. Joseph Co., 237 F.3d 
394, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 156  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)), aff’d, N.C. State Bd. of Dental 
Examiners v. FTC, 191 L. Ed. 2d 35, 48 (U.S. 2015). 
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state.157  Board membership typically consists of volunteers 
ordinarily appointed by the governor, most of whom are usually 
physicians, though several non-physicians often serve as well.158  In 
New Jersey, for example, the enabling statute gives the governor 
appointment rights for the Board of Medical Examiners (as it is 
called in New Jersey), and outlines all of the responsibilities of the 
Board; in particular, the Board decides the scope of practice of 
medicine, and enforces that scope through the Attorney General.159  
The statute specifically states that the “Governor shall give due 
consideration to, but shall not be bound by, recommendations 
submitted by the appropriate professional organizations of this 
State.”160  In other words, professional, private organizations have a 
voice in gubernatorial appointments to the boards.  While it makes 
sense that the governor receives advice regarding who the best 
candidate would be for the position, it is nonetheless suspicious 
when the law requires the exectuive branch to listen to a 
professional organization’s recommendations as to board members 
who will decide who gets to compete with it.  Although a prudent 
assessment of that professional organization’s conduct may find 
conflicts of interest, the State Action Doctrine renders it immune to 
judicial scrutiny.  However, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in N.C. State 
Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC recently made it somewhat harder for 
state boards to engage in anticompetitive behavior.161 
v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC 
The pertinent facts of the case arose when the North Carolina 
Board of Dental Examiners decided to investigate, and then 
independently issue cease and desist orders to non-dentists 
engaging in the commercial business of teeth-whitening, which the 
Board considered to be the practice of dentistry.162  As Justice 
Kennedy later observed, while North Carolina had delegated control 
to the Board over the practice of dentistry, the relatively new practice 
 
 157  Oregon. v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1092 (D. Or. 2002) (“The 
determination of what constitutes a legitimate medical practice or purpose 
traditionally has been left to the individual states”).  
 158  FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., Frequently Asked Questions About State Medical Boards, 
http://www.fsmb.org/policy/public-resources/frequent-questions#g1 (last visited Mar. 
20, 2015). 
 159  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-2.1 (West 2015). 
 160  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-2.2 (West 2015). 
 161  See generally Dental Exam’rs, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 35. 
 162  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2013), 
aff’d, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 191 L. Ed. 2d 35 (U.S. 2015). 
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of teeth whitening was not included in the empowering act as “the 
practice of dentistry.”163  The FTC charged the Board with 
“violating 15 U.S.C. § 45, the FTC Act, by excluding non-dentist 
teeth whiteners from the market” in violation of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.164  The Board petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review, 
seeking application of the State Action Doctrine.165 
1. The Fourth Circuit Decision 
First, the Fourth Circuit upheld the earlier determination by the 
FTC that as a “public/private hybrid entit[y]” the Board lacked 
government supervision, and was therefore a private actor.166  In 
concluding that the Board was not exempt under state action, the 
Fourth Circuit looked specifically at the “Parker Doctrine,” which 
lists three situations under which an entity can claim immunity.167  
The Board had claimed immunity under the second Parker 
situation—the Midcal test—wherein “private parties can claim 
the Parker exemption if acting pursuant to a ‘clearly articulated and 
affirmatively expressed [] state policy’ and their behavior is ‘actively 
supervised by the State itself.’”168  Recognizing that 
“fundamental national values of free enterprise and economic 
competition [] are embodied in the federal antitrust laws,” the court 
sanctioned state-action immunity “only when [] clear that the 
challenged anticompetitive conduct [was] undertaken pursuant to a 
regulatory scheme that [was] the State’s own.”169 
The court went on to determine that the regulatory scheme in 
question failed the Midcal test, since the Board could not show that 
it was actively supervised by the State.170  According to the Fourth 
Circuit, the Board lacked supervision because its membership was 
elected exclusively by private actors—that is, only other dentists 
elected the Board, without the involvement of the Governor or any 
 
 163  Dental Examiners, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 46. 
 164  Dental Examiners, 717 F.3d at 365. 
 165  Id. at 366. 
 166  Id. at 368-70. 
 167  Id. at 366 (citing S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 442 (4th Cir. 
2006)); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568, (1984); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n 
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 
Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1003, 1010, (2013). 
 168  Dental Exam’rs, 717 F.3d at 367 (citing Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal 
Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105) (1980)). 
 169  Id. at 367-68 (internal quotations omitted). 
 170  Id. at 368. 
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other elected official.171  This was sufficient for the FTC—and 
subsequently the Fourth Circuit—to hold that the board was a 
private entity, even though it was created through an act of the State.  
However, while the concurring opinion’s gloss on the majority 
opinion stressed that the ruling was narrow, and that had the Board 
been chosen by elected officials, Midcal would have been satisfied, 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision has broadened the ruling 
remarkably.172 
2. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
In affirming the Fourth Circuit, Justice Kennedy stressed that to 
gain Parker immunity, a state agency must prove “more than a mere 
façade of state involvement,” specifically, that “[the] States accept 
political accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit and 
control.”173  The Court recognized that the private concerns of active 
market participants, when those participants serve on state agencies, 
pose a danger to consumers if private actors work to further their 
own interests, rather than those of the State.174  Therefore, the 
government must seek assurance that those private actors are in fact 
pursuing the State’s interests in addition to their own.175  The Court 
went on to hold that state boards controlled by active participants 
in the market which the board regulates must satisfy the active 
market participation test of Midcal in order to enjoy Parker 
immunity. 
The Court introduced a test for “active supervision” that would 
satisfy Midcal.176  As a general proposition, such an inquiry is 
“flexible and context-dependent.”177  Supervision “need not entail 
day-to-day involvement in an agency’s operations,” but must probe 
“whether the State’s review mechanisms provide ‘realistic assurance’ 
that a nonsovereign actor’s anticompetitive conduct ‘promotes state 
policy, rather than merely the party’s individual interests.’”178  The 
 
 171  Id. at 377 (Keenan, C.J., concurring) (“Here, the fact that the Board is comprised 
of private dentists elected by other private dentists, along with North Carolina’s lack of 
active supervision of the Board’s activities, leaves us with little confidence that the state 
itself, rather than a private consortium of dentists, chose to regulate dental health in 
this manner at the expense of robust competition for teeth whitening services.”). 
 172  See id. at 376-77. 
 173  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 191 L. Ed. 2d 35, 48-49 (2015). 
 174  Id. at 49. 
 175  Id. 
 176  Id. at 55. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Id. (citing Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100-01 (1988)). 
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Court identified four specific requirements of state supervision: first, 
the state supervisor must review the substance of an anticompetitive 
board decision, not simply whether it was procedurally proper; 
second, the supervisor must have the power to modify or veto the 
decision; third, the supervisor must be an active participant in the 
decision, rather than simply having the potential to intervene; and 
fourth, the supervisor may not itself be an active market 
participant.179  The Court then stated that further analysis would rely 
upon context and the specific circumstances of the case.180 
3. Implications of Dental Examiners 
While the Court’s decision in the case has not completely 
opened the door for APRNs to expand their scope of practice, it has 
limited the ability of state boards to act in an anticompetitive 
manner without the mandate of the State.  The FTC charged the 
Dental Board when the Board unilaterally sought to enforce its own 
definition of the practice of dentistry; a definition that was not 
statutorily enunciated because, as Justice Kennedy observed, the 
statute did not include “teeth whitening” in its definition.181  The 
Board’s particular violation of antitrust law was its unsupervised 
action taken against competitors.  If the Board had written the cease 
and desist letters under proper supervision, then the FTC would 
have had no case.  Accordingly, state boards of medicine may not 
take such anticompetitive, unilateral action with regard to those 
they judge to exceed the scope of practice.  Whether such action is 
currently being taken, however, is not immediately apparent. 
This decision should force states to reexamine their current 
oversight of professional boards.  While states probably have 
sufficient process to cover the Court’s active supervision test under 
their Administrative Procedure Acts, it is obvious, given the facts of 
Dental Examiners, that there are some actions of state boards that 
may have otherwise been overlooked.182  In New Jersey, for example, 
state licensing boards are vested with investigative powers.183  While 
state licensing boards must exercise these investigative powers 
through the attorney general, that process must be examined in light 
 
 179  N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 191 L. Ed. 2d at 55. 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. at 46. 
 182  See generally, John Gedid, Administrative Procedure for the Twenty-First Century: An 
Introduction to the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 44 ST. MARY’S L. J. 241 
(2012).  
 183  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-18 (West 2015). 
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of the Dental Examiners test to ensure proper oversight.184  The New 
Jersey Board of Medical Examiners certainly falls under the auspices 
of Dental Examiners, since the Board is comprised of at least 16 MDs 
and/or DOs (Doctors of Osteopathy), all of whom should be 
considered active market participants.185  Furthermore, the Board is 
given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear before it.186  It is 
not absurd to think that the Board could use this power in an 
intimidating, anticompetitive manner, just as the North Carolina 
Dental Board used cease and desist letters. 
Ultimately, Dental Examiners calls for sufficient oversight of 
specific actions taken by state boards.  I do not contend that it 
reaches those medical societies and advocates covered by the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine, nor do I propose that it can erode legislation 
or regulations duly enacted by elected state actors.  The decision 
affects the anticompetitive actions of Boards when they have not 
been specifically empowered to operate in this manner.  If the New 
Jersey Board of Medical Examiners decided tomorrow to start 
sending letters to nurse practitioners demanding that they cease and 
desist treating patients, even when they are doing so under a state-
approved collaboration scheme with a physician, then that would 
definitely fall under the kind of behavior prohibited by Dental 
Examiners. 
I doubt one could successfully argue that Dental Examiners 
affects scope of practice statutes, since those are passed by the 
legislature.  Legislation of this kind is necessarily exempt from 
federal antitrust action due to the state action doctrine.  State boards 
of medicine do not themselves create and pass scope of practice 
laws, and to the extent that they regulate the practice of medicine, 
those regulations must pass scrutiny by the legislature, thus 
satisfying the active supervision requirement.187  Only if it could be 
shown that a state board had such autonomy as to pass scope of 
practice regulations without meaningful review from the legislature 
could Dental Examiners overturn such legislation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The facts favoring the expansion of the scope of practice for 
Advanced Practice Registered Nurses are compelling, and 
momentum is entirely in favor of expansion.  It is up to the 
 
 184  See id. 
 185  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-1 (West 2015). 
 186  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-2 (West 2015). 
 187  See generally Gedid, supra note 182, at 33. 
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legislatures to act, however, and though change may occur 
incrementally, it continues towards expansion.  Although Dental 
Examiners may prove a strong tool for antitrust litigants against 
specific anticompetitive actions taken by state boards of medicine, 
it is limited to those circumstances when boards actually take such 
action themselves, and should not affect scope of practice 
legislation.  Since Noerr-Pennington allows any sort of 
misrepresentation to be made in support of the prospect that only 
physicians will be the gatekeepers to public health, the legislatures 
should allow themselves to be guided, not by the campaign 
contributions of physicians’ organizations, but by the social 
contributions of nurses and their advocates. 
The ultimate point of Dental Examiners, and the point of scope 
of practice legislation, is that legislatures, not private actors, should 
decide what is best for the public welfare.  This is not to say that 
legislators are themselves all experts in the fields of medicine or 
nursing.  Legislators are experts in the field of governing, and are 
entrusted with the just governance of the people, and with their 
welfare.  They are also accountable to those people, which is why 
they are so entrusted.  The Noerr-Pennington and State Action 
doctrines represent the recognition that legislators must be free to 
govern as they see fit.  I do not argue against that proposition, or 
those doctrines.  It is apparent that the decision regarding the proper 
scope of practice for APRNs lies in the hands of legislators, not 
physicians or nurses. I only argue that such a decision must be 
properly informed by objective study and careful consideration, by 
the opinions of both physicians and nurses, and by the concern for 
the overall health and welfare of state populations, not by concern 
for physicians’ pocketbooks. 
 
